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Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to outline Situational Action Theory (SAT) and its
Developmental Ecological Action Model (DEA model) as applied to the explanation of
criminal careers. The DEA model of SATwas first presented by Wikström in 2005, [34]),
and subsequently refined inWikström and Treiber in 2018, [43]), and is further elaborated in
this paper.
Methods This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the role of crime causation in the
explanation of criminal careers and pathways in crime. The central argument is that if
we want to explain stability and change in people’s crime involvement we first have to
understand what factors and processes move people to commit acts of crime. Only then
can we adequately assess what factors and processes are involved in the explanation of
criminal careers and people’s differential pathways (trajectories) in crime.
Results The DEA model of SAT address some of the main limitations of current
dominant explanatory approaches in Developmental and Life-Course (DLC) Criminol-
ogy [39], and champions a general, dynamic and mechanism-based account of the
causes of crime [38], and the drivers of criminal careers [47]. It integrates and extends
key insights from two great but poorly amalgamated traditions in the study of crime and
its causes: the individual/developmental and ecological/environmental traditions. It
provides a new approach to the study and explanation of crime and criminal careers
with implications for how we approach the problem of crime prevention policy and
practise.
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A criminal career is made up of a series of crime events occurring over some period of time
at some (typically) unequal interval. How do we explain people’s criminal careers and their
different pathways in crime involvement? I submit that without first understanding the
causes of crime events it is not possible to adequately explain people’s criminal careers. If we
do not know why people commit acts of crime how would we know why they embark on a
criminal career (repeated offending over some time period)? And howwould we knowwhy
people’s crime involvement change over the life course? Effectively addressing questions of
onset, duration and desistance in crime involvement requires knowledge about what moves
people to engage in acts of crime.Without such knowledge, it is difficult to identify with any
certaintywhat changes inwhat personal and environmental factors are causally relevant and
what processes may be the drivers of stability and change in these personal and environ-
mental factors.
Developmental and Life-Course Criminology and Its Current
Limitations
Developmental and life-course criminology (DLC criminology) has emerged as a prom-
inent and important perspective in the study of crime and its causes [10], some even argue
that ‘life-course criminology is criminology’ [7:310]. At the core of DLC criminology is
the study of criminal careers and their characteristics. A criminal career has been defined
as the ‘characterization of the longitudinal sequence of crimes committed by an individual
offender’ [2:12] and the main objective of developmental criminology has been stated as
the study of ‘temporal within-individual changes in offending’ [16:117].
People vary in their crime involvement, and among those involved in repeated
offending, they vary in their pathways in crime. Pathways have been defined as “a
common pattern of development shared by a group of individuals, which is distinct
from the behavioural development experienced by other groups of individuals” [19:98].
Group-based trajectory modelling (e.g. [28]) has been employed to identify the number
of pathways in crime (i.e. the identification of groups of people with similar trajectories
in crime involvement). Typically, this research comes up with 3–4 main groups (e.g.
[13:485]),1 although there are trajectory studies that identify more groups than so. The
most well-known and well-developed criminal career pathways classification is un-
doubtedly Terrie Moffitt’s [23, 24] ‘developmental taxonomy’ that suggests two main
groups of criminal careers; adolescence-limited and life-course persistent offenders.2
The great advantage of Moffitt’s approach is that she takes seriously the role of the
person-environment interaction. However, as most DLC theories,3 her explanation
focuses on detailing the sources of crime propensity rather than the causes of crime
1 In which the largest group typically consists of those who commit no or only occasional crimes in the period
of study. Differences in the number of identified groups appear partly related to what kind of data are used (e.g.
self-reported or official recorded crime) and the age period covered by the study.
2 While the existence of an adolescence-limited group of offenders in Western developed countries seems
largely uncontroversial, the existence of a life-course persistent group has generated more disagreements (e.g.
[30]).
3 David Farrington and colleagues observes that “Most theories try to explain the development of offenders,
but some (e.g. the integrated cognitive antisocial potential theory and the situational action theory) also try to
explain the occurrence of offences” [12:750].
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events, and consequently, it lacks any explicit action theory (linking propensity to
action).
DLC criminology has made a significant contribution to criminology as regards
advancing our knowledge of patterns in people’s crime involvement and their changes
over the life course, particularly from childhood to young adulthood4 (e.g. [11, 14, 15,
18, 20, 21, 22, 29, 32, 33, 48]). However, it has been less successful in terms of
developing satisfactory explanations of the drivers of people’s criminal careers and
different pathways in crime [39]. I suggest that one prime reason for this is that many
DLC researchers tend to adopt a public health perspective, with its strong focus on
identifying risk (and protective)5 factors (i.e. predictors) often with problematic causal
status. The problem is well illustrated by Joseph Murray and David Farrington
([26]:639, my emphasis) in the following quote6;
‘Offenders differ significantly from nonoffenders in many respects, including
impulsiveness, low IQ, low school achievement, poor parental supervision,
punitive or erratic parental discipline, cold parental attitude, child physical abuse,
parental conflict, disrupted families, antisocial parents, large family size, low
family income, antisocial peers, high delinquency rate schools, and high crime
neighbourhoods. Further, the probability of an adverse outcome such as CD or
delinquency increases with the number of risk factors. While the precise causal
chains that link these factors with antisocial behaviour, and the ways in which
these factors have independent, interactive, or sequential effects, are not well
understood, it is clear that numerous replicable risk factors have been identified’
A risk factor is commonly defined as a predictor; a factor (variable) that is statistically
significantly associated with and precedes the outcome (e.g. [6, 17]). Prediction (a
forecast of an outcome based on a regularly occurring association between and time
ordering of the predictor and the outcome) is not the same as causation. It is only one
criterion for establishing causation. To distinguish between ‘causes’ and ‘predictors’ we
also need to identify a plausible process that connects the putative cause and the effect
and that produces the effect. In other words, we need to make a strong and credible
argument for why and how the putative cause would produce the effect in question. For
example, is there any plausible causal process that would explain why ‘a large family
size’ would make anyone throw acid in another person’s face, sexually abuse a child or
break into another person’s house? If there is no probable causal process linking a
predictor with the outcome in question, it is unlikely we are dealing with a causal
relationship7 (see further, [37]). It is safe to assume that most identified ‘risk factors’
(crime predictors) are markers and symptoms rather than causes.
4 Few longitudinal studies of crime go beyond the age of 30.
5 The difference between risk and protective factors is essentially that the former is supposed to increase and
the latter to decrease the risk of crime involvement.
6 CD in the quote refers to “conduct disorders”.
7 The safest way to establish causation is through experimentation but this is rarely a feasible option in DLC
research. The common idea, that ‘controlling for other variables’ helps establish causation (e.g. [27]:12–13), is
largely misguided. It should also be noted that establishing causal relevance through experimentation does not
in itself provide explanation, i.e. provide any understanding of the process by which the putative cause
produces the effect (on the problem of prediction, causation and explanation, see further, [37]). Knowing why
and how a cause produces an effect may be crucial for developing effective policy and prevention.
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The problem of distinguishing between causes and predictors is a problem that has
been acknowledged by many leading DLC scholars. Rolf Loeber observes that ‘the
causal relationship between the risk factor and the outcome is often far from clear, and
may even be absent’ [17:4]. David Farrington recognises that ‘a major problem with the
risk factor paradigm is to determine which risk factors are causes and which are merely
markers or correlated with causes’ [9:7]. This problem is particularly pertinent when a
risk and protective factor approach is applied to policy and prevention since there are
good reasons to believe that most identified risk and protective factors lack causal
efficacy (i.e. are only markers or symptoms). Addressing non-causal factors in crime
prevention policy and practise is obviously only a waste of time and money.
The confusion often caused by the concept of risk factor is well illustrated by the fact
that it is not uncommon to come across the argument that risk factors are not causes of
crime but that reducing risk factors would reduce crime, which, of course, does not
make much sense. It is important to realise that all statements that include concepts
such as ‘influence’, ‘effect’, ‘increase’, ‘reduction’ or ‘change’ imply the supposition of
some causal efficacy. Moreover, all claims that removing or altering some factor would
prevent an outcome (such as an act of crime) imply the assumption that the factor has
some causal efficacy relating to the outcome.
One intriguing but unexplained finding of DLC criminology (and risk factor re-
search more generally8) is the common result that the more risk factors a person
displays, the more likely she or he is to also display the outcome (e.g. crime involve-
ment). This is generally discussed as the phenomenon of ‘cumulative risk’ [22:122, 31]
and has sometimes, within the policy approach of risk-focused prevention, led to the
mistaken idea that the more risk factors we can eliminate or counteract, the stronger the
preventive effect on the outcome becomes. However, better prediction does not
necessarily equal stronger causation. In fact, strong (even perfect) prediction may not
imply any causation at all,9 and without causation there is no possibility of preven-
tion.10 Cumulative risk is unlikely to equal cumulative causation.
To advance our knowledge about criminal careers and their causes (and its
prevention), we need to move beyond a risk and protective factor approach to
explanation (and as a basis for devising prevention policy and practise) and instead
focus on the identification of which triggers and processes are causally relevant and
important in explaining criminal careers and different pathways in crime. I submit
that to do this we need (i) an adequate action theory that explains what moves
people to engage in acts of crime, (ii) an ecological approach that identifies the role
of personal and environmental factors and their interaction in this process, and, on
this basis, (iii) an identification and explication of the processes that drive stability
and change in causally effective crime relevant personal (propensity) and environ-
mental (inducement) factors.
8 Gary Evans and colleagues observes that ‘One of the primary limitations of CR is the lack of theoretical
explanation for its predictive power. At present, there is no theoretically compelling rationale to account for the
superior predictive power of multiple versus singular risk factor exposures on child outcomes’ [8:1380]. CR in
the quote stands for cumulative risk.
9 Causation requires prediction, but prediction is no evidence of causation.
10 To prevent something is to make something not happen that otherwise would have happened.
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Advancing DLC Criminology: the DEA Model of SAT
The developmental ecological action model (the DEA model) of situational action theory
(SAT) is aimed at helping to overcome some common problems in DLC criminology (e.g.
the lack of action theory, the neglect of properly addressing the role of the person-
environment interaction in crime causation and the confusion of causes and correlates).
A regular DLC argument is that the causes of crime (typically conceptualised as risk and
protective factors) are different for different people, at different stages of a criminal career
and in different developmental phases/ages (see, e.g. [25]). SATon the other hand proposes
a general theory of crime causation arguing that the causes of crime are the same for all
people, at all ages and at all stages of a criminal career [38].
The DEA model of SAT offers an ecological-action theoretical perspective in the
study and explanation of the development and life course of people’s criminal careers.
Its analysis of people’s pathways in crime and their characteristics is based on the
following premises:
1. The basis for explaining people’s criminal careers is the understanding of what
moves people to engage in acts of crime (action theory).
2. Acts of crime are an outcome of the interaction of people’s crime propensity
(dependent on their personal morals and ability to exercise self-control) and
criminogenic exposure (dependent on the moral context of the opportunities and
frictions they encounter in the setting in which they take part) (ecological
perspective).
3. Stability and change in people’s crime involvement (and differential pathways in
crime) is a consequence of (patterns of) stability and change in people’s crime
propensity and/or criminogenic exposure (development and change).
4. The main drivers of stability and change in people’s crime propensity are the
psychosocial processes of moral education and cognitive nurturing and the main
drivers of stability and change in people’s criminogenic exposure are the
socioecological processes of social and self-selection (drivers).
5. The content and efficacy of the psychosocial and socioecological explanatory
processes involved are context dependent, that is, dependent on relevant cultural
(rule-based) and structural (resource distribution-based) features of the society and
its constituent parts in which these processes occur (context).
Why Crime Happens
At the core of any proper explanation of human action (such as acts of crime) is an
adequate action theory that specifies what moves people to action. Crimes are actions
that breaches rules of conduct stated in law. As such they are no different from rule
breakings more generally. Situational action theory (SAT) maintains that people are the
source of their actions but that the causes of their actions (such as acts of crime) are
situational [35, 36, 38, 40, 45].
SAT explains people’s acts of crime and their rule breakings more generally, as a
consequence of how they perceive their action alternatives and make their choices in
response to the motivators (temptations, provocations) they experience in particular
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settings.11 SAT proposes that people essentially commit acts of crime because they see
them as a viable and acceptable action alternative in the circumstance (and there is no
relevant or strong enough deterrent) or they fail to act in accordance with their own
personal morals (i.e. fail to exercise self-control) when externally pressured to act
otherwise.
Whether or not an act of crime is seen and chosen as an action alternative in relation
to a specific motivator is the outcome of a perception-choice process initiated and
guided by the interaction of the person’s crime propensities and the setting’s
criminogenic inducements (Fig. 1). This process may be more or less automated
(ranging from predominantly habitual to predominantly deliberative) depending on
the nature of the circumstances (see further, e.g. [35]:97–104). The key proposed
elements of the perception-choice process are motivators (goal-directed attention), the
moral filter (which provides action alternatives in relation to motivators in particular
circumstances) and controls (self-control and deterrence which affects non-habitual
processes of choice when people deliberate between action alternatives). For details of
the key suggested elements of the perception-choice process and their role in this
process, see, e.g. Wikström [38].
SAT stipulates that people’s crime propensity (their tendency to see and choose
crime as an action alternative in particular circumstances) is dependent on their law-
relevant personal morals and ability to exercise self-control.12 SAT define a person’s
personal morals as her or his value-based and emotionally grounded views about what
is the right or wrong thing to do or not to do in particular circumstances. A person’s
ability to exercise self-control is her or his ability to act in accordance with her or his
own personal morals when externally pressured to act otherwise. The theory further
maintains that a setting’s criminogeneity (its tendency to encourage [or not discourage]
particular kinds of crime) is reliant on the moral context applicable to the opportunities
it provides and the frictions it creates. The moral context is the moral norms (perceived
shared rules of conduct and their degree of homogeneity), and the level and efficacy of
their enforcement, relevant to a settings opportunities and frictions.
People are different (have different crime propensities) and so are environments
(have different criminogenic inducements). Whether or not a crime will happen
depends on what kind of person is in what kind of setting. A person’s particular crime
propensities are activated by a setting’s specific criminogenic inducements and a
setting’s particular criminogenic inducements are made relevant by a person’s specific
crime propensities. In other words, it is all about interactions.
The proposed nature of the propensity-exposure interaction is that people with low
crime propensity (as a consequence of a strong law relevant personal morality and a
strong ability to exercise self-control) are largely resistant to a setting’s criminogenic
11 SAT differentiates between place (a location and its immediate environment) and setting (what a person in a
particular place experience with her or his senses at a particular moment in time). The latter emphasises the
importance of selective perception, different people in the same place may pay attention to different things
depending on their experiences, preferences and skills. However, in this paper, this distinction is of no great
importance for the arguments forwarded so I will make no particular point of distinguishing between place and
setting, using them interchangeably as referring to the micro-environments in which people take part.
12 Please note that a person’s crime propensity is not their personal morals and ability to exercise self-control
but that these are the two main sources of people’s crime propensity (i.e., their tendency to see and choose
crime as an action alternative).
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inducements while people with a stronger crime propensity are vulnerable to such
inducements, and increasingly so the stronger their crime propensity is (for empirical
support of this assertion, see [46]). People vary in their general crime propensity (i.e. in
the range of circumstances in which they may see and chose crime as an option).
People also vary in their crime-specific crime propensities (e.g., for some, shoplifting
may be an acceptable action alternative while threatening another person with violence
to get their possessions may not). A highly crime-prone person is one who tends to see
and chose crime as a viable and acceptable action alternative in a wide range of
circumstances.13
Explaining Criminal Careers
Understanding criminal careers (including criminal career aspects such as onset,
duration and desistence) is fundamentally a question of understanding what propels
stability and change in people’s crime involvement.
If people’s acts of crime are an outcome of the interaction between their crime
propensity (dependent on their law-relevant personal morals and ability to exercise self-
control) and their exposure to criminogenic settings (i.e. places whose moral context
encourage [or do not discourage] crime as a response to its opportunities and frictions),
it is a reasonable hypothesis that stability and change in people’s crime involvement is a
consequence of stability and change in their crime propensity and criminogenic
exposure. That is so, because a person’s crime propensity and criminogenic exposure
constitutes the input to the perception-choice process that ultimately determines wheth-
er or not a crime will happen (Fig. 1). Alter the input and the behaviour will change.
Changes in a person’s personal morals (content) or ability to exercise self-control
(cognitive machinery) affecting her or his crime propensity, and/or changes in the moral
contexts she or he takes part in affecting her or his level of criminogenic exposure, will
13 When analysing specific types of crime, e.g. crimes of violence, a highly violent prone person is one that
tends to see and choose acts of violence as a viable and acceptable action alternative in a wide range of
circumstances.
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Fig. 1 The causes of crime according to SAT
change her or his likelihood of engaging in acts of crime. Let me give two examples. A
lowered crime propensity (e.g. as a consequence of the development of a stronger law-
relevant personal morality or a stronger ability to exercise self-control) may make
people more resistant to settings’ criminogenic inducement (i.e. make them less likely
to see and chose crime as an action alternative). A decrease in the time a person spends
in criminogenic settings may reduce their overall crime involvement regardless of any
changes in her or his crime propensities.
Different combinations of continuity and change in people’s crime propensity and
criminogenic exposure will cause different patterns of continuity and change in their
crime involvement and its nature (e.g. as captured by criminal career concepts such as
duration, escalation and desistence). If stability and change in people’s crime propensity
and criminogenic exposure fundamentally explains stability and change in their crime
involvement, the key question then becomes, what drives stability and change in
people’s crime propensity and criminogenic exposure?
The Drivers of Stability and Change: the DEA Model of Situational
Action Theory
According to the DEA model of SAT, what largely drives stability and change in
people’s crime propensity are psychosocial processes of moral education and cognitive
nurturing and what principally drives stability and change in people’s criminogenic
exposure are socioecological processes of social and self-selection (Fig. 2).14
These are lifelong processes (causal chains)15 in which current states (propensities,
exposures) are a result of past developments (influences) at the same time as they set
the stage for future developments (influences). They do not occur in a social vacuum
but are dependent for their content and efficacy on the wider social context in which
they occur (i.e. the cultural [rule-based] and structural [resource-distribution-based]
characteristics of society and its constituent parts). Changes in the cultural and struc-
tural context in which these processes take place may modify their content and affect
their efficacy. The basic processes are not unrelated because the socioecological
processes influence not only people’s exposures to criminogenic settings16 but also
their exposures to (other) settings of relevance to the content and efficacy of their moral
education and cognitive nurturing.
Psychosocial Processes
The basic proposition is that stability or change in a person’s crime propensity between
two time points essentially is a result of stability or change in processes of moral
education and/or cognitive nurturing between the same two time points.
14 These processes are also referred to as the ‘causes of the causes’ in the SAT explanatory framework.
15 Birth (or in some aspects even pre-birth) is the natural starting point and death the natural end point for these
processes.
16 People’s experiences of criminogenic settings are not only a question of their level of criminogenic
inducement but they may also form an important part of their crime relevant moral education (as discussed
further below).
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Moral education refers to the continuous learning and evaluation process by which
people come to adopt, modify and change value-based and emotionally grounded rules
of conduct about what is the right or wrong thing to do or not to do in particular
circumstances. The central (sub) mechanisms of moral education are instruction (written
or verbal), observation of others’ actions, their consequences and the reactions they evoke
and trial and error (personal ‘experimentation’, trying out actions and experiencing their
consequences and others’ reactions). Of special interest when analysing the emergence
and changes in people’s crime propensity is the role in moral education of the law and law
making (e.g. its rule guidance) and the operations of the criminal justice system (e.g. its
general and specific deterrent qualities). People are not passive recipients of moral
experiences but they actively evaluate (and re-evaluate) those experiences against the
background of their previously acquired personal morals and cognitive abilities. Changes
in people’s personal morals are typically gradual rather than instant. However, moral
transformations may be accelerated in certain developmental phases or as a response to
significant life events or social changes.
Cognitive nurturing refers to the experiential processes (limited by a person’s neurological
constitution and baseline capacities) that positively influence neurocognitive capacities and
their expression. The training of cognitive skills (executive functions) is important for
strengthening people’s ability to exercise self-control, but may also be relevant for their ability
to acquire, understand and apply rules of conduct. Changes in crime relevant cognitive skills
may also be affected by biological processes of maturation and ageing and a consequence of
(brain) injury and ill health (for further details and discussion, see [43]:284–285). Changes in
people’s cognitive abilities are typically slow but heighten at specific developmental phases,17
such as in childhood, and may be instant in certain cases of injury or illness.
Socioecological Processes
The basic proposition is that stability or change in a person’s criminogenic exposure
between two time points essentially is a result of stability or change in processes of
social selection and self-selection between the same two time points.
17 Benjamin Bloom has convincingly argued that ‘variations in the environment have the greatest quantitative
effect on a characteristic at its most rapid period of change and least effect on the characteristic during the least
rapid period of change’ [1: vii].
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Fig. 2 The drivers of stability and change in people’s crime involvement according to the DEA model of SAT
Social selection refers to the cultural (rule-based) and structural (resource-distribution-
based) conditions in a jurisdiction (e.g. a nation or a city) affecting its member’s differential
exposure to particular kinds of settings (including criminogenic settings). It is the
rule- and resource-distribution-based circumstances that enable (encourage or
compel) or restrict (discourage or bar) particular kinds of people from taking part
in particular kinds of time- and place-based activities.18 Social selection has a
generalised influence on what kinds of settings different social groups of people
will take part in (e.g. some social categories are more likely to have a higher
exposure to criminogenic settings than others). Depending on what social catego-
ries people belong to (e.g. by gender, age, ethnicity and social class), particular
cultural and structural aspects of society are more relevant than others in shaping
and forming their day-to-day life. To comprehend the role in the explanation of
crime of such things as societal inequality and segregation requires an understand-
ing of how processes of social selection help create a differential exposure to the
settings in which people act (and, over the longer term, develop). Changes in
processes of social selection, typically as a result of political, economic and
technological changes, are typically gradual but can in more extreme cases be
fast or even instant (such as in times of sudden or rapid social change).
Self-selection refers to the person’s preference and agency-based choices of taking
part in particular kinds of settings within the constraints of the forces of social selection.
People vary in their activity preferences depending on their previous life history
experiences (i.e. how these experiences have helped form and shape their desires and
wants). They also vary in their agency (their powers to make things happen) affecting
their capacity to materialise their preferences. Agency is partly age-related. For exam-
ple, as a new born or toddler, humans have very limited, if any, agency. With increasing
age people’s agency tends to increase. However, it is highly variable among people
depending on their human, financial and social capitals.19 Some people have much
more agency than others.
The combination of processes of social and self-selection determine the content
of a person’s daily life. The particular configuration of the kind and nature of the
settings (e.g. family, school, work and leisure settings and their characteristics) a
person typically takes part in may be referred to as her or his activity field [44].
People vary in their activity fields, and in the extent to which they include
criminogenic settings. A person’s activity field, the system of settings in which
she or he takes part, constitutes their personal social context (embedded in and
indirectly dependent on the larger social context of the society in which she or he
lives and operates).
The Role of the Crime Event in Processes of Moral Education and Self-Selection
The crime event naturally has a central role in any analysis of criminal careers since a
criminal career constitutes a series of crime events. The fact that past crime regularly is
18 For example, at certain ages, people are expected to attend school, to get a job and support themselves etc.
19 Human capital refers to things such as skills and experiences, while social capital refers to the access to
resourceful social networks.
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found to be a good predictor of future crimes does not imply that the former causes the
latter.20 Since the causes of crime are situational [35, 38], there is no direct causal link
between one crime event and the next.21 However, people’s past crimes may
indirectly influence their current crimes through the potential impact on the
psychosocial and socioecological processes of relevance for the development
and change of their crime propensity and criminogenic exposure (as indicated
by the dotted lines in Fig. 2). The DEA model of SAT proposes specifically that
people’s experiences of taking part in a crime event (and repeated crime events)
may influence (a) their future crime propensity by influencing the psychosocial
processes of moral education and (b) their future criminogenic exposure by
impacting the socioecological process of self-selection.
Crime events (as moral experiences) are an essential part of the process of law-relevant
moral education. Depending on the reasons for why a person engages in an act of crime, its
outcomes and its consequences for the actor and others, taking part in a crime eventmay lead
to changes in a person’s personalmorals. For example, themoral experience of a crime event
may result in a re-evaluation of certain action alternatives in particular circumstances that,
depending on its direction, may increase or decrease the person’s crime propensity. More-
over, repeated experiences of (‘successfully’) carrying out certain acts of crime in particular
circumstances may in some cases result in the ‘normalisation’ of such responses or even
create a habituation (i.e. cause the seeing and choosing of crime as an action alternative in
certain circumstances to become an automated response). The potential influence on a
person’s future law-relevant personal morals from the moral experience of committing a
particular act of crimemay be seen as part of the earlier mentioned ‘trial and error’ (‘personal
experimentation’) sub-mechanism of moral education.
The experience of crime events may also influence people’s future inclinations to
take part in or shun particular kinds of settings (i.e. influence their self-selection).
For example, it may lead to them increasingly seek out or tend to avoid criminogenic
settings, hence, affecting their future criminogenic exposure. For example, positive
experiences (of whatever kind) of engaging in crime events may encourage a person
to become more immersed in a ‘criminal lifestyle’ causing an amplified
criminogenic exposure, e.g. as a consequence of increased ‘pre-planning’ and
‘search behaviour’. On the other hand, increased negative experiences of different
kinds from a ‘life of crime’ may lead to the development of an ambition to actively
avoid taking part in settings that the actor believes risk getting her or him into trouble
with the law or otherwise (see, e.g. [3]).
In addition to the potential impact of carrying out acts of crime, experiences of being
a victim of crime, or witnessing a crime event, (or repeated such experiences) may also
have some significant influences on a person’s future law-relevant personal morals (i.e.
increase or decrease their crime propensity) and tendency to seek out or avoid
criminogenic settings (e.g. avoiding certain places through increased fear of
victimisation).
20 Correlation is not causation.
21 Please note that a crime event can involve several types of crimes (law violations), e.g. an attack on another
person can involve illegal threats, violence and vandalism (a person may smash a bar chair on the head of
another person at the same time as threatening to kill his family).
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Drivers of Criminal Careers and Their Context Dependency
Psychosocial processes influencing people’s crime propensity and socioecological
processes affecting people’s criminogenic exposure do not happen in a social vacuum.
They are dependent for their content and efficacy on the social context22 in which they
occur (i.e. the cultural [rule-based] and structural [resource-distribution-based] charac-
teristics of society and its constituent parts) (Fig. 2).
The process of moral education (i.e. the process of acquiring, modifying and
changing personal morals) is dependent on the moral contents of the social context in
which it takes place because it provides the input to the process. What moral teachings
and experiences people comes across (through instruction, observation and ‘trial and
error’) and the efficacy of their communication is contingent upon their day-to-day
activities and interactions with relevant others (e.g. parents, teachers, peers, partners,
and work mates) and encounters with various forms of written, oral and visual media.
The specific configuration of activities, relevant others and media exposures that a
particular person encounters in their everyday life (its content and efficacy) constitutes
the (immediate) social context (the activity field) in which her or his moral education
takes place (which, in turn, is embedded in and feed upon the wider moral climate of
the society at large and its homogeneity).
The content and efficacy of the process of cognitive nurturing is dependent on the
extent to which people’s day-to-day experiences (the activities they take part in and the
people they interact with) encourage and provide opportunities for proficient training of
their cognitive capacities, for example, by exercising problem-solving, patience, con-
centration and restraint (see further, [43]:285). For people with cognitive impairments,
the access to and quality of support and care (e.g. through the health services) may be of
central importance. A person’s particular configuration of the activities she or he takes
part in and the kinds of people she or he interacts with constitutes the key elements of the
social context in which her or his cognitive nurturing occurs. The wider society and its
constituent parts may be more or less well organised and competent in terms of its key
relevant social institutions and practises as regards their encouragement and support of
particular social groups and individuals cognitive nurturing.
Each society is a result of historical processes of social emergence,23 creating
particular patterns of spatial and temporal population and activity differentiation. These
are manifested in a mosaic of rule- and resource-based settings and their specific
characteristics (including their levels of criminogeneity) that constitutes the wider social
context in which processes of social selection operate and on which they are reliant.
Depending on the specific cultural (rule-based) and structural (resource-distribution-
based) context of a society, processes of social selection will have particular outcomes
(e.g., in terms of their influences on different population segments’ and ages’ config-
urations of exposures to criminogenic and other settings). Changes in a society’s
cultural and structural features may change the operations and consequences of social
22 Urie Bronfenbrenner [4] makes a strong and convincing general argument for the importance of analysing
human development in context, and the importance of considering how the immediate context that directly
affects people’s development is embedded in and dependent on the wider social contexts.
23 Social emergence refers to the process by which a society become as it is, dependent on complex historical
processes, including political, economic and technological progression and change.
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selection, generally and for specific social categories (e.g. by gender, age, ethnicity and
social class), with implications for their exposure to criminogenic and other settings.
However, and as discussed earlier, people are not passive recipients of influences
from social forces but actively navigate their lives within the constraints of social
selection. Some social contexts are more constraining than others, generally, or for
particular groups of people (i.e. leaving them less room for manoeuvre). In other words,
the efficacy of self-selection is context dependent and may vary between different
social categories (e.g. by gender, age, ethnicity and social class24).
Key Dimensions of Criminal Careers and Their Explanation
The DEA model of SAToffers a parsimonious way of explaining criminal careers, their
characteristics and people’s different pathways in crime: Stability and changes in
people’s crime involvement (prevalence and frequency) reflects stability and changes
in their crime propensity and exposure to criminogenic settings. This is simply so
because crime events are an outcome of the interaction between a person’s crime
propensity and exposures to criminogenic settings, and changes in a person’s crime
propensity and/or her or his exposure to criminogenic settings will change the number
of criminogenic interactions she or he encounters and thereby affect her or his crime
involvement. A criminogenic interaction occurs when a person with a sufficiently
strong crime propensity encounter a setting with a criminogenic inducement that is
sufficiently strong to activate her or his crime propensity.25 Different combinations of
continuity and change in people’s crime propensity and criminogenic exposure will
cause different patterns of continuity and change in their crime involvement and its
nature.
The DEA model of SAT proposes that all key descriptive criminal career parameters
(see e.g. [16]), for example, those that refer to duration (onset and termination),
regularity of offending (e.g., acceleration and de-acceleration) and the nature of crime
and its changes (e.g., seriousness: escalation and de-escalation; versatility: increased
and decreased diversification), can be explained as outcomes of stability and changes in
the frequency and nature of the criminogenic interactions people encounter in their
daily life.
Coda—Towards a Mechanism-Based Approach to the Explanation
and Prevention of People’s Crime and Criminal Careers
The DEA model of SAT is aimed at, within the framework of an adequate action theory
and a mechanism-based explanatory approach,26 building upon and extending key
24 For a recent study of the link between social disadvantage and criminogenic exposure, see Wikström and
Treiber [41].
25 For example, when a person who tends to see and choose violence as an action alternative in response to
being disrespected confronts a setting in which such disrespect is shown to her or him.
26 For a strong and convincing general argument regarding the advantages of mechanism-based explanatory
approaches see Mario Bunge [5].
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insights from two poorly integrated but great traditions in the study of crime and its
causes: the individual/ developmental and social ecological/environmental traditions.
In this paper, I have argued that to fully understand and explain criminal careers (and
people’s different pathways in crime) we first need to explicate what causes crime
events. I have maintained that (1) crime events are an outcome of a perception-choice
process triggered and guided by the interaction between people’s crime propensities
(based on their personal morals and ability to exercise self-control) and criminogenic
exposure (based on the moral contexts of the temptations and provocations the settings
they encounter provide), and, consequently, that (2) changes in people’s crime involve-
ment and its nature is a result of changes in their crime propensity and/or criminogenic
exposure. Moreover, I have proposed that (3) the drivers of these changes are psycho-
social processes of moral education and cognitive nurturing (affecting people’s crime
propensity) and processes of social and self-selection, (affecting people’s exposure to
criminogenic settings). Finally, I have insisted that (4) these processes are context
dependent as regards their content and efficacy.
Against this background, I suggest that DLC criminology should aim at making a
shift towards a more mechanism-based approach to the understanding and explanation
of criminal careers (and pathways in crime). I further suggest that devising effective and
lasting prevention policy and practises would benefit from a focus on developing
integrated programs and interventions that is aimed at influencing the proposed basic
drivers of criminal careers; the crime relevant aspects of processes of moral education,
cognitive nurturing and social and self-selection (e.g. [42]).
The basic assumptions of the DEA model of SAT has been tested and supported in
research from the UK prospective longitudinal Peterborough Adolescent and Young
Adult Developmental Study (PADS+), a study that was especially designed to test core
propositions of SAT and its DEA model (see, [47]).
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